Organizational safety factors

A simplistic view of safety (applicable to any other performance) consists in considering only the constant application of rules - all the rules, nothing but the rules. This ideal application of rules would a priori guarantee the desired result. Perfect application of the rules (themselves presumed to be perfect or near-perfect) would be the norm: any deviation is a task to be treated as such.

Technological components perform their functions with the minimum of failures. Operators carry out their tasks, as far as possible like automatons, alas unreliable and constantly having to be called to order. Management monitors, tracks down deviations, identifies them and punishes them.

While some systems still seem content with this very simplistic vision, most have come to realize (perhaps as a result of painful experience) that infallibility is hardly a matter of course for either technological artifacts or human beings. Thus, the most widespread version of safety accepts that failures and errors do occur, and the system protects itself as best it can from their consequences by multiplying (if possible intelligently) safety measures.

We speak of defense in depth, redundancy, catch-up loops, independent barriers and so on. This model, which dominates today, has made it possible to undertake potentially very dangerous activities (energy, chemicals, transport, health) with a level of risk deemed acceptable.

However, the need for progress in the wake of very serious industrial or natural accidents, and paradoxically, in the absence of accidents, the feeling that safety is a given, means that risks must be reduced to levels that are difficult to achieve (under economic constraints and the almost immediate availability of products or services). Over the last few decades, three areas of progress have contributed to better risk management:

• advances in component and equipment operating safety;

• advances in system reliability thanks to their architecture (redundancies);

• progress in the capacity of safety management (formalization of safety management systems or non-formalized awareness) to embrace more of the factors influencing system performance.

These demands for progress cannot only be met by better application of the basic principles, but also come up against their limits: current research into the workings of the organizations concerned shows that the reality is more complex and richer.

Faced with this complexity, we can become discouraged, turn our backs and stick to the simple models with which we are familiar, striving to reduce risks by means of more...